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Stochastic models with economy-wide shocks imply that the welfare costs of aggregate volatility are 
negligible. In reality idiosyncratic shocks are important, and empirical evidence suggests that their 
volatility is several times that of aggregate shocks. This paper introduces both types of shocks. We find 
that if in the process of eliminating aggregate risk the policymaker can reduce idiosyncratic risk by a 
modest amount, in accordance with available empirical evidence, the welfare gains from aggregate 
stabilization can become significant. The introduction of idiosyncratic risk has important implications for 
asset pricing, and in particular may reduce the risk-free rate substantially, through the precautionary 
savings motive. Many of our results are sensitive both to the degree of risk aversion, and to the flexibility 
of labor supply. The paper highlights the tradeoffs involved in analyzing the effects of risk on growth and 
welfare, on the one hand, and on asset pricing, on the other, clarifying the need to examine these issues 
within a unified stochastic general equilibrium framework. 
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Attempts to assess the impact of risk on resource allocation and macroeconomic performance 
have generated anomalies and have been plagued by puzzles.  Two such puzzles are intimately 
related.  The first concerns the growth and welfare effects of output volatility, the so-called costs of 
business cycles.  Assuming complete markets and the simplest exogenous growth model, Lucas 
(1987) obtains very small effects of economy-wide volatility on growth and welfare.  He shows that 
the welfare cost of identically and independently distributed aggregate fluctuations is less than 0.1% 
of the consumption flow; see also Lucas (2003) for a review.  Using a stochastic endogenous growth 
model, but with a larger menu of assets available to diversify risks, Turnovsky (2000) reaches a 
similar quantitative conclusion.   
The second issue concerns the equity premium and risk-free return puzzles of Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) respectively.  Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that a plausibly 
parameterized representative agent stochastic exchange economy predicts an equity premium of at 
most 0.35%, in sharp contrast to the historically observed premium of about 6% in U.S. data.  Weil 
(1989) points out that this is because the risk-free return generated by such a model is far in excess 
of the 0.8% average secular risk-free rate suggested by the data.   
The fundamental problem is that the aggregate risk in a developed economy such as the 
United States is far too small to generate plausible equilibrium responses in the representative agent 
model.  Empirical cross-country studies by a variety of individuals suggest that the annual standard 
deviation of aggregate output fluctuations in OECD economies averages around 4%, though in the 
United States it is somewhat lower, being around 2.5%; see Danthine and Donaldson (1993), Gali 
(1994), Gavin and Hausmann (1995).  Aggregate consumption volatility is even lower, being of the 
order of 1–2%.  Since in the standard stochastic growth model, aggregate output risk influences 
growth as a variance, the contribution of aggregate risk is essentially negligible.  By the same token, 
the risk premium is obtained by “pricing “risk at the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R.  Again, 
given the small aggregate risk, a meaningful risk premium requires that the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion be unrealistically high.
  Accordingly, Obstfeld (1994) bases his analysis on values of R 
= 18, while Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) have proposed values of R as high as 30.   3 
But the assumption that all risk is economy-wide and can be diversified is clearly restrictive.  
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) criticize the Lucas method of focusing on aggregate shocks, claiming 
instead that incomplete markets are a potential source of large growth effects of output volatility.  
Indeed, while aggregate risk in the US economy may be small, empirical evidence suggests that 
idiosyncratic risk has a standard deviation that is several times larger in magnitude; see Deaton and 
Paxson (1994), Pischke (1995), and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999, 2001), Meghir and 
Pistaferri (2001), Krebs and Wilson (2004).  Accordingly, recently, substantial effort has been 
devoted to analyzing the role of idiosyncratic risk in yielding more significant effects of risk on 
growth and aggregate welfare.  Initial effort in this direction was begun by İmrohoroğlu (1989) who 
calculates the costs of business cycles in a simple incomplete markets economy where each agent 
has a storage technology.  The shocks she considers have only limited persistence, and accordingly 
she finds the costs of aggregate fluctuations to be small, though larger than with complete markets.  
Subsequent important work, including in some cases more persistent shocks, has been conducted by 
Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002), Storesletten et. al. (1999, 2001), and 
Krebs (2003) among others.
1  While in some cases the welfare costs of aggregate shocks remain 
small, in other cases, most notably Krebs, substantially larger welfare costs are obtained. 
This paper develops a general equilibrium stochastic growth model of capital accumulation 
with both economy-wide and idiosyncratic shocks in the individual production process.  The shocks 
are specified as Brownian motion processes, so that all shocks are permanent.  We assume the 
absence of a risk-free asset, implying that individuals have to bear all risk inherent in their risky 
capital.  We introduce elastically supplied labor in conjunction with an appropriate production 
technology, so that the equilibrium is one of endogenous stochastic balanced growth.  The inclusion 
of labor income is an important feature of the model, since it has the desirable property of increasing 
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth from around 0.06, in the absence of labor income, 
to more plausible values of over 0.2; see e.g. Carroll (2000), Carroll and Kimball (1996).
2  By 
endogenizing labor we can address another issue discussed in the literature, namely the effect of 
                                                 
1 Other related contributions include Clark, Leslie and Simmons (1994), Barlevy (2000), and Chatterjee and Corbae 
(2002).  Angeletos and Calvet (2001) assume uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and examine the transitional dynamics of a 
neoclassical growth model.   
2 This characteristic is shared by Turnovsky (2000) for the case of complete markets and no idiosyncratic shocks 4 
labor flexibility on asset returns and its potential to stabilize consumption, enabling us to extend the 
work of Bodie et al (1992) to a general equilibrium framework.
3  
Our objective is to determine the welfare gains from stabilizing for the aggregate shocks in 
the presence of idiosyncratic risk.  Since we are concerned primarily with numerical magnitudes, we 
calibrate the model and thereby obtain a quantitative assessment of these effects on both a number of 
key economic variables, as well as their impact on economic welfare.  The general conclusion is that 
idiosyncratic shocks in individual productivity under incomplete insurance may be an important 
factor in determining significant magnitudes of the growth and welfare effects of stabilizing for 
aggregate volatility.   
A key aspect of our model is to allow for the potential dependence of individual risk 
(volatility) upon aggregate market risk.  Intuitively, it seems plausible to argue that the risk specific 
to an individual is likely to vary with the overall risk present in the aggregate economy.  There are 
several ways of formulating this type of relationship.  Steresletten et al (1999, 2001) relate individual 
volatility to the aggregate state of the economy (as described by a particular realization of the 
aggregate shock), and associate the elimination of aggregate risk with the reduction of business cycle 
variation in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to a common average value.  Beaudry and Pages 
(2001) also assume that individual volatility depends upon realizations of aggregate shocks such that 
idiosyncratic risk is higher in recessions and lower in expansions.  In their formulation the 
relationship is expressed in such a way that eliminating aggregate volatility leads to the simultaneous 
elimination of idiosyncratic volatility, so that their measure of welfare gains leads to the complete 
elimination of both types of risk.  Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) 
compute the welfare gains of eliminating aggregate volatility in the presence of incomplete markets 
and consumer heterogeneity respectively.  Extending Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith 
(1999) introduce an “integration principle” whereby the elimination of aggregate risk eliminates the 
variability of idiosyncratic risk, thus leading to a constant average level; see also Krebs (2003).   
In this paper, we adopt a slightly different approach, one that can be viewed as a complement 
                                                 
3 Bodie et al (1992) examine the introduction of labor supply flexibility in a partial equilibrium framework and find that 
it helps smooth consumption in the presence of risk. Basak (1999) examines a stochastic equilibrium related model with 
labor and human capital but does not consider endogenous leisure choice. Bianconi (2001) discusses the effects of 
labor/leisure choice and market completeness on asset prices in a static general equilibrium framework. 5 
to the Krusell-Smith integration principle.  We focus on the case where all agents face common 
idiosyncratic risk (although different realizations of individual shocks).  We then project average 
idiosyncratic risk on aggregate risk and measure the extent to which changes in the latter lead to 
changes in the former.
4  Because of the critical role played by this relationship in our calibration, we 
are concerned about its robustness, and to this end we base our empirical analysis on three 
alternative measures of idiosyncratic risk all computed from the PSID data.  Overall, our results 
provide convincing evidence of a strong positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and 
aggregate risk, suggesting that a 1 percentage point reduction in aggregate risk may quite plausibly 
be associated with between a 1 and a 3 percentage point reduction in idiosyncratic risk. 
As expected, the model continues to yield the conclusion that the gains from stabilizing for 
economy-wide fluctuations alone are negligible, even for high degrees of risk aversion.  However, 
for plausible sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk to aggregate volatility much larger welfare gains from 
stabilizing for aggregate risk are obtained.  Moreover, most of the gains come from the associated 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk rather than in the elimination of aggregate risk itself.  For example the 
gains from reducing idiosyncratic risk by 0.025 from 0.15 to 0.125 are approximately 12 times those 
resulting from the comparable reduction of aggregate risk from 0.025 to zero.
5  While the welfare 
gains are of course sensitive to the degree of risk aversion, our numerical analysis suggests that 
welfare gains of 2-4% are not implausible.  These are obviously significant quantities and are 
consistent with the empirical estimates of the costs of recession, with idiosyncratic risk obtained by 
Clark, Leslie and Simmons (1994).  Labor flexibility is shown to decrease the costs of business 
cycles and thus reduce correspondingly the welfare gains from their stabilization. This is because it 
introduces an additional margin along which an individual can buffer productivity shocks so that as 
risk increases, additional labor supply (less leisure) can compensate for potential losses in income. 
As Constantinides and Duffie (1996) argue, the introduction of permanent idiosyncratic 
shocks offers a promising approach to enriching the asset pricing implications of the representative 
                                                 
4 One way of describing the difference is that the Krusell-Smith integration principle is associated with reducing the 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk (across agents), our approach is associated with reducing its mean. 
5 Krebs (2003) reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis where he finds that almost all the welfare gains from 
eliminating business cycles is due to the elimination of the variation in uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. 6 
agent model.
6  Although our paper is concerned primarily with growth, as a by-product it provides 
interesting implications for asset pricing from a general equilibrium production perspective.
7  Using 
basic asset market equilibrium relationships we derive the implicit return on the risk-free asset.  As 
in previous models, aggregate risk has a negligible impact on asset pricing.  By contrast, as in Saito 
(1998), the introduction of idiosyncratic risk reduces the risk-free rate substantially.  This is because 
it has a significant impact on precautionary savings, putting downward pressure on the rates of 
return.
8  With the mean productivity of capital, and thus its mean rate of return, determined by labor 
supply, which is largely insensitive to idiosyncratic production risk, the bulk of the adjustment is 
borne by a reduction in the risk-free rate.  This in turn is reflected by a substantial increase in the 
implied equity premium.  Indeed, we find for a slightly higher but still plausible degree of 
idiosyncratic risk, that if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is increased to 9, the premium on 
the return to capital increases to 6% and the risk-free rate declines to 0.8%, consistent with the 
empirical evidence.  This may be consistent with the empirical estimates obtained by Clark, Leslie, 
and Simmons of the welfare gains of stabilization of aggregate shocks as long as their elimination is 
associated with only a modest reduction in idiosyncratic risk.  
The key to these asset pricing implications, (besides idiosyncratic shocks being permanent), 
is that the idiosyncratic risk is tied to capital which is nonmarketable, making the risk 
nondiversifiable.  In this respect our implications for asset pricing with nondiversifiable risk are 
consistent with those obtained by previous authors, though using somewhat different frameworks.
9  
We therefore do not mean to suggest that they provide a serious resolution to the equity premium 
puzzle, which relates to the returns on marketable securities.  More importantly, because of the 
                                                 
6 Campbell (1999) provides a related result in the context of idiosyncratic labor income pointing out that with plausible 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic labor income, risk aversion must be unrealistically large to give meaningful equity 
premiums. Saito (1998) provides the connection between the Constantinides and Duffie (1996) model and the simple 
Merton (1969) framework showing that the impact on risk premiums can be obtained without the complex pattern of 
time variation in the conditional variance of idiosyncratic shocks suggested by Constantinides and Duffie (1996). 
7 The implications of incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk for asset pricing has generated substantial literature, 
much of which is reviewed by Constantinides (2002).  Of particular relevance is the contribution by Krebs and Wilson 
(2004) which we note further in footnote 24 below.  
8 Carroll and Samwick (1997) present empirical evidence of precautionary saving using PSID data. 
9  Heaton and Lucas (1992) and Lucas (1994) examine the effects of nondiversifiable risk in economies without 
production and find that individuals would self-insure when faced with idiosyncratic transitory risk. Our analysis 
considers permanent idiosyncratic shocks in a production economy.  Saito (1998) examines the effect of idiosyncratic 
risk on the riskless return in a simple stochastic growth model and in this respect our approach represents an extension of 
his work. 7 
individual's ability to use his labor/leisure choice to buffer risk, we also show that labor supply 
flexibility works in the opposite direction to the idiosyncratic shocks, thus reducing the risk 
premium.  But despite labor supply flexibility, nondiversifiable permanent shocks still can have 
substantive effects on the risk premium.  Our analysis highlights the tradeoffs involved in analyzing 
the effects of risk on growth and welfare, on the one hand, and on asset pricing, on the other, thereby 
clarifying how the two issues are intimately related and emphasizing the need to examine both 
within a unified stochastic general equilibrium framework.
10  In addition, we make a methodological 
contribution to the continuous-time stochastic endogenous growth model by providing a solution 
with endogenous labor/leisure choice and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the basic macroeconomic structure and 
develops the macrodynamic equilibrium.  Most of our analysis is conducted numerically and Section 
3 discusses the basic calibration of the economy.  Section 4 discusses in some detail the 
measurement of the aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, while Section 5 assesses the relative 
importance of economy-wide and idiosyncratic risk on the key macroeconomic issues.  Section 6 
provides a brief discussion of the asset pricing implications, while Section 7 concludes.  Details of 
the solutions and specific derivations are relegated to an Appendix. 
2.1   Production 
The economy is populated by a large number, I, of individuals indexed by i.  Each individual i, 
is endowed with one unit of time that he allocates between leisure, l, and labor, (1 − l).  There is only 
one good in this economy.  A typical individual i, produces output, dQi, in firm i, in accordance with 
the stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function 
()
1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ii i i i i dQ A l B K K dt dy dz Z dt dy dz
β β − =− + + ≡ + +     0 < β <1 (1) 
where Ki  is the individual instantaneous stock of capital, (1− l)BiK  is the individual labor supply in 
efficiency units, and  i i KK I ≡∑  measures the average per individual economy-wide stock of 
                                                 
10 The link between welfare costs and excess returns in our framework derives from our adoption of the Merton (1969) 
framework where volatility and mean returns are positively related. Thus, the elimination of volatility may lead to 
welfare gains and simultaneous effects on mean and excess returns. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) carefully study the link 
between the cost of consumption uncertainty, the equity premium and the slope of the term structure of real interest rates.  8 
capital.  The parameter β  determines the magnitude of the labor share in total output and the extent 
of the external effect on production, as in Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), and more recently 
Corsetti (1997) and Turnovsky (2000).  We show below that the adjusted efficiency term Bi K yields 
a hybrid of exogenous labor-augmenting and externality spillover technologies. 
The technology is subject to two types of stochastic shocks.  First, dy is a normally 
distributed temporally independent economy-wide total factor productivity shock common to all 
individuals and having mean zero and constant variance σy
2dt over the instant dt.  Second, the agent 
is subject to a normally distributed temporally independent, individual-specific, total factor 
productivity shock, dzi, with mean zero and constant variance σz
2dt over the instant dt, common to 
all agents.  In order to focus on the diversification of the two sources of shocks, we assume that they 
are uncorrelated. We assume that agents are identical in all respects, except in their random drawing 
they receive of the idiosyncratic shock.  Thus, since the labor supply decision is based on common 
information it is identical for all agents, and thus need not be indexed by the individual agent. 
An important feature of the model is the assumption that, although the shocks themselves are 
uncorrelated, in general equilibrium  the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks (measured by its 
standard deviation say) is an increasing function of the volatility of the economy-wide disturbances.  
Intuitively, it is plausible to argue that economy-wide risks are likely to exacerbate the individual-
specific risks.  Indeed, we find compelling empirical evidence to support such a relationship. 
The stochastic production function exhibits constant returns to scale in both the private 
decisions, the fraction of time devoted to work and the individual capital stock, as well as in the 
individual and aggregate capital stocks.  The labor-augmenting technology comprises two 
multiplicative components, Bi K.  Bi parameterizes an internal effect generated by the accumulated 
effects of the idiosyncratic total factor productivity shocks and its variance.  In the absence of such 
an internalized effect we will find that the aggregate production function will be incapable of 
generating equilibrium ongoing growth.  However, we also find that a specific, but plausible 
specification of Bi is able to restore ongoing growth at both the individual and aggregate levels. 
Aggregating (1) over the I individuals, yields the economy-wide (average) stochastic output  9 
()
1









≡= − + + ∑∑    (2) 
For a sufficiently large number of agents, I, the law of large numbers implies  / 0 i idz I → ∑ ; i.e. as 





ii i ii dQ B K K





≡= − + ∑∑    (2’) 
As we shall show below, the macroeconomic equilibrium is one in which the aggregate (average) 
capital and individual capital stocks grow in accordance with 




ψ =+        ( 3 a )  





dt dw dx dt dw dx
K
ψψ =+ + ≡+ +     (3b) 
where ψ,ψ i are the mean economy-wide and individual growth rates, and dw,  dxi are the mean 
economy -wide and individual shocks to the equilibrium growth rate.  Thus in equilibrium, all agents 
accumulate capital at the same average rate, though subject to idiosyncratic shocks that reflect the 
underlying shocks to productivity.   
  Taking the stochastic differential of  i KK  and using (3a) and (3b) implies that agent i’s 
relative stock of capital evolves according to   






=       
Assuming that all agents begin with the same initial endowment of capital, Ki,0 = K0 , the solution to 
this equation is 
    
2 (1 2) ( ) (0) ()
()
xi i txt x i Kt
e
Kt
σ −+ − =        ( 4 )  
so that the ratio of agent i’s stock of capital to the economy-wide average capital stock reflects the 
accumulation of the individual shocks to his stock of capital, as well as the volatility through time.     10 
Substituting (4) into the aggregation relationship  i i KK I ≡∑ , and multiplying the 
individual shocks xi(t)− xi(0)  by (1− β), implies 
    
()
22 12( 1 ) (1 )( ( ) (0)) 1




β σ β − −− = ∑        (5) 
Then, using (4) we obtain 
()
22 (1 ) (1 2)(1 ) (1 )( ( ) (0)) (1 2)(1 ) 11
() ()
xi i x tx t x t
i
ii
Kt K t e e e
II
β β σβ β β σ − −− − − −− == ∑∑  (6) 
Assume for the moment that Bi =1, as would be the case in a deterministic economy [see Romer 
1986].  Then substituting (6) into (2’) we obtain  
   
() ()
2 12( 1 ) 1( )
x i t idQ
dQ Ae l K dt dy
I
β ββ σ −− ≡= −+ ∑     (7) 
That is, the aggregate production function is linear in the accumulating stock of capital, with 
productivity increasing with employment.  However, the presence of idiosyncratic risk in the capital 
accumulation process causes the productivity of capital to decline with time, and thus precludes the 
existence of a stochastic balanced growth path.
11 
  A stochastic balanced growth can be restored by introducing an exogenous stochastic labor-
augmenting component having the property 
     ()
()
2 12( 1 ) xt
i EB e
β βσ β −− =        ( 8 )  
There are several ways this may be achieved, the most natural being to assume
12 
    
()
2 12 () ( 0 ) xi i txt x
i Be
σ −+ − =        ( 9 )  
This specification asserts that, Bi, the stochastic labor-augmenting technological change impinging 
on individual's i  technology comprises two components.  First, the accumulation of past 
idiosyncratic exogenous total factor productivity shocks enhance the labor-augmenting technology 
                                                 
11 The reason for this is the fact that for Brownian motion processes variances are first order terms. 
12The condition (8) for on-going growth is the analogue to the conventional “knife-edge condition”  1 i B = , associated 
with the conventional Romer model, to which it reduces in the absence of risk.   11 
and has a positive permanent impact on labor efficiency.  On the other hand, the volatility associated 
with the idiosyncratic exogenous productivity shocks has an adverse impact on labor efficiency.  Our 
production technology is a hybrid of the exogenous labor-augmenting technological change, Bi and 
the externality from spillovers, K, familiar from Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986).  Substituting (9) 
into (1) and using (4) we see that in equilibrium, individual output follows the process 
    (1 ) ( ) ( ) ii i i i dQ A l K dt dy dz Z dt dy dz
β =− + +≡ + +    (10a) 
while substituting (9) directly into (2’) and evaluating, equilibrium aggregate output evolves 
according to 
() 1( ) ( ) dQ A l K dt dy Z dt dy
β =− +≡ +     (10b) 
Thus, the introduction of the stochastic labor-augmenting technological change with the externality 
from spillovers ensures that in equilibrium both individual and aggregate output are generated by 
stochastic “AK” technologies and therefore are consistent with an equilibrium stochastic balanced 
growth path.  It is important to stress that both (10a) and (10b) are equilibrium relationships. 
  We assume that the wage rate, r Li , over the period (t,t + dt) paid by producer i is determined 
at the start of the period and is set equal to the expected marginal physical product of labor in that 















== = −  − 
    (11a) 
which is directly proportional to the capital stock employed by the firm.  In equilibrium, firms 
having more capital and therefore more productive workers pay proportionately higher wages. 
  We assume that capital depreciates non-stochastically at the rate δ per unit of time.  The rate 
of return to capital in firm i is thus determined residually, by 







dQ K dt l dR
dR r dt du
K
δ − −−
=≡ +     (11b) 12 
where  





r A l d u d yd z A l d yd z
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ββ βδ ≡− − − ≡ + = − +  











== = −  − 
    (11a’) 
(1 )
K KK
dQ Kdt l dA
dR r dt du
K
δ −− −
=≡ +      (11b’) 
where rK is defined above and  
    (1 ) K
Z
du dy A l dy
K
β ≡= − 
Individual and aggregate returns to capital have the identical means, though the former is more 
volatile, since the idiosyncratic risk is eliminated in the aggregate.
 13 
According to this specification, the wage rate is fixed over the period (t,t +dt), with all 
short-run fluctuations in output being reflected in the stochastic return to capital.  While this 
allocation of risk may seem extreme, it may be rationalized with the argument that wages are 
sluggish due to contractual arrangements.  Furthermore, casual empirical evidence suggests that the 
returns to capital are more significantly volatile than are wages.
14  Equations (11) imply further that 
the mean rate of return to capital is constant through time, while the average wage rate grows with 
the aggregate capital stock.  These characteristics are consequences of the aggregate AK technology. 
2.2   Individual Consumption, and Capital Accumulation 
The individual agent is assumed to choose his consumption and rate of capital accumulation 
to maximize the expected value of the intertemporal constant elasticity utility function 
                                                 
13 The source of idiosyncratic risk in our model is individual total factor productivity as opposed to labor income.  This is 
a plausible and alternative source of variability given, for example, the possibility of household productive activities and 
individual-specific human capital accumulation not captured by the non accumulating factor. 
14 In the United States, for example, the relative volatility of real stock returns over have typically been around 20% per 
annum, while the relative volatility of wages have been comparable to that of output, 2%.  As we note in Section 6, the 
assumption that all output volatility is reflected in the return to capital can generate reasonably plausible risk-return 
properties of average stock returns. 13 
   ()
0
1 t
i EC l e d t
γ θρ
γ
∞ − ∫    1, 0, γ θ −∞< < >  ρ > 0   (12a) 
subject to the stochastic accumulation equation  
   () (1 )
ii iK i L i i K dK r K r l C dt K du =+ − −+      (12b) 
where we assume that consumption and leisure are chosen at the nonstochastic rates Cidt ,  ldt, 
respectively.  Note that the agent, being atomistic, treats his wage as evolving exogenously, although 
in equilibrium it is tied to his capital stock in accordance with (11a).  In the Appendix we show that 
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dK
r d td wd x d td wd x
K
ργ γ σ σ ψ
γ
 =− + − + + + ≡ + +  − 
   (13a) 
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22 11








ργ γ γ γ σ σ
γ

=− + − − − − +  − 
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=          ( 1 3 c )  
    ( 1 ) ( 1 ) K rA l
β β δ =− − −       (13d) 








− =−         ( 1 3 e )  
   
22 2 2 (1 ) ;     (1 ) wy dw A l dy A l
ββ σ σ =− = −      ( 1 3 f )  
   dxi = A(1− l)




2     (13h) 
In addition the equilibrium must satisfy the transversality condition, which for the constant elasticity 
utility function is given by 





 =               ( 1 3 j )  14 
In the Appendix we show that this condition reduces to  (1 ) i i CK A l
β β >− .
15 
  Equations (13a) and (13b) describe the individual’s mean growth and consumption-capital 
ratio, while (13c) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.  Substituting 
for (13d) –(13h) equations (13a) – (13c) jointly determine  , , and  ii i CK l ψ , in terms of parameters 
that are assumed to be identical for all agents, thus validating our assumption that each agent’s labor 
supply is identical.  The key point to observe about these equations is that the agent’s equilibrium 
depends upon the overall volatility of wealth, as measured by the sum of the economy-wide and the 
individual-specific variances.  It is only with respect to specific realizations of the idiosyncratic 
shocks that individual agents may differ. In particular, the consumption/capital ratio in (13b,c) is 
identical for all i so that perfect aggregation across individuals is feasible. The term involving the 
overall volatility, 
2 2
x w σ σ +  in the consumption/capital ratio in (13b) represents the precautionary 
saving component of the marginal propensity to consume. 
2.3 Macroeconomic  Equilibrium 
  Averaging (13a) and (13b) over the I individuals in the economy and substituting for the 
equilibrium returns to capital and labor we see that the key equilibrium quantities, namely the 
equilibrium economy-wide growth rate, the consumption-capital ratio, fraction of leisure time, and 
aggregate and individual volatilities are given by 
()
22 2 2 11




A l A l dt dw dt dw
K
ββ βδ ρ γ γ σσ ψ
γ
 =− − − − + − − + + ≡ +  − 
 (14a) 
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22 2 2 11
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− =−          ( 1 4 c )  
22 2 2 (1 ) wy Al
β σ σ =− ; 
222 222 (1 ) ( ) wx yz Al
β σ σσ σ += − +     (14d) 
Comparing (14a) with (13a) we see that the economy-wide mean growth rate is identical to the 
                                                 
15This condition asserts that consumption/capital ratio exceeds labor income, a condition that is met in all of our 
simulations.  It reduces to the original condition,  0 CK> , obtained by Merton (1969), in the absence of labor income.  15 
individual’s rate of capital accumulation; both depend upon the economy-wide and the individual-
specific risk.  However, because the individual-specific shocks average out in the aggregate, the 
volatility of the aggregate growth rate is reduced to σw
2 , in contrast to σw
2 +σ x
2, for the individual’s 
rate of capital accumulation.  Written in the form (14b), we see that effect of the net return to capital 
on consumption depends upon −γ , reflecting the fact that it has both a positive income effect and a 
negative substitution effect.  In contrast, labor income, βA(1− l)
β , is fully reflected in consumption.  
Thus (14b) is a generalization of the conventional expression for the consumption-capital ratio, to 
which it reduces in the absence of labor income. 
Of particular significance is the welfare of the representative agent, as the economy evolves 















∞ − Ω≡ =
  −−   ∫      ( 1 5 )    
Given the transversality condition (15) implies it Ωγ > 0.  Equation (15) forms the basis for 
analyzing the impacts of changes in volatility on economic welfare.  We do so by converting the 
changes implied by (11b) into certainty equivalent measures of initial capital stock. 
  The qualitative effects of an increase in either economy-wide risk, σy
2, or idiosyncratic risk, 
σz
2, on the key equilibrium quantities can be immediately determined from equations (14) and (15).  
Since both sources of risk enter additively, they have the same qualitative impact.  Thus, in the more 
plausible case where γ < 0, an increase in either source of risk will reduce the consumption to 
capital ratio, increase the time devoted to labor (reduce l) and thus raise the productivity of capital, 
its growth rate, and volatility.  This is because with sufficiently risk averse agents, higher capital 
variability requires a higher rate of return on investment which is associated with higher growth 
rates.  The reduction in the consumption-capital ratio is also a reflection of the positive precautionary 
savings effect, a further manifestation of the higher volatility on growth.  This relationship, generally 
typical of linear stochastic growth models of this type, runs counter to some recent empirical 
evidence suggesting that volatility and growth are negatively related.
16  Irrespective of the impact on 
                                                 
16 This same result is obtained by Obstfeld (1994) and Grinols and Turnovsky (1998).  It runs counter to recent empirical 
evidence by Ramey and Ramey (1995) that finds growth and volatility to be negatively correlated.  However, the 16 
consumption and growth, higher volatility has an adverse effect on welfare.   
3. Calibration 
  The qualitative effects just noted are straightforward.  It is obvious that the idiosyncratic 
shocks, by influencing the equilibrium additively with the economy-wide shocks, provide a 
reinforcing effect.  The interesting issue is one of the magnitudes and to this we now turn.   
We calibrate the model using the following parameters characteristic of the US economy. 
 
Production parameters  β = 0.6, A = 0.65, δ = 0.04 
Preference parameters 
ρ = 0.04;  γ = −1.5,−4,−8
θ = 1, 1.75, 2.5  
Stochastic shocks  σy = 0, 0.025, 0.04; 
σz =0, 0.15, 0.20, 0.26  
 
The production parameters are standard. The choice of β  implies the elasticity of labor in 
production is 0.6, while the choice of A and θ implies a K/Y ratio in the range of 3.2.  Setting the 
rate of depreciation at 4% implies the (mean) net return to capital in the economy is 8.6%.  The rate 
of time preference of 4% is also standard.  Empirical evidence on the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion,  R ≡1− γ , is far-ranging.  Epstein and Zin (1991) obtain values of R clustering around 
unity, consistent with a logarithmic utility function, while at the other extreme, early efforts to 
resolve the equity premium puzzle induce authors to take R as high as 18 or even higher.  However, 
Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra, (2002) present alternative empirical evidence to suggest that 
R lies most plausibly in the range 2–5, a range that appears to be gaining increasing acceptance.  
Since one of the key issues concerns the role of the coefficient of risk aversion, we allow γ  to lie in 
the range –1.5 to –8, with the corresponding values of R being between 2.5 and 9.
  
 The  parameter  θ describes the degree of substitution between leisure and consumption in 
utility.  The value θ = 1.75 corresponds to the value chosen in the business cycle literature and 
implies equilibrium fractions of time devoted to leisure of around 0.7, consistent with the empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                   
empirical evidence is not unambiguous and early studies by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) obtain a positive relationship, 
more supportive of the qualitative implications of this model. 17 
evidence. In effect, θ may be related to measures of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the 
real wage. Thus, θ = 1, θ = 2.5 correspond to low substitution for leisure (or low elasticity of labor 
supply) and high substitution for leisure (or high elasticity of labor supply), respectively.
 17 
  The critical parameters of our numerical simulations are the relative volatility of average per-
capita income and individual idiosyncratic shocks.  Gali (1994) provides estimates of σ y for OECD 
countries, measured as percentage variations of GDP about trend output.  The mean figure he obtains 
using this measure is around 6%; the figure for the US being 3.6%.  Other authors, using different 
measures obtain somewhat smaller estimates, around 2.5% being typical for the US; see Gavin and 
Hausmann (1995), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Danthine and Donaldson (1993).  Estimates obtained 
for σz are much larger.  Pischke (1995) finds the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks to be 
around 6.5 times as large as the standard deviation of average per capita income.  Deaton and Paxson 
(1994) find a similar pattern using the volatility of consumption data.  Storessletten et. al. (1999) use 
the same methodology of Deaton and Paxson (1994) to provide direct GMM-based estimates of the 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks that are much larger than the previous estimates.  We also 
find in our sample data that the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks is much larger than 
alternative measures of aggregate risk.  Finally, Krebs and Wilson (2004) provide an extensive 
discussion of recent empirical evidence on idiosyncratic risk, from which we conclude our range of 
values for  z σ  is entirely consistent with the values they propose. 
The key issue that we wish to consider concerns the potential co-reduction in idiosyncratic 
risk with the aggregate volatility.  We noted at the outset how the seminal work by Lucas (1987, 
2003) focused entirely on the welfare gains of eliminating aggregate volatility, with no consideration 
of individual volatility.  We also noted the approach of subsequent authors such as Atkeson and 
Phelan (1994), Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002), Krebs (2003) to incorporate idiosyncratic risk, and 
how their analysis of the welfare gains of stabilizing for aggregate shocks, by eliminating the 
variability in idiosyncratic risk.  On the other hand, it is plausible to argue that idiosyncratic risk is in 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Hansen and Wright (1992) and Cooley (1995) for business cycle models that include endogenous labor/leisure 
choice. The elasticity of labor supply that we refer to is evaluated in general equilibrium across balanced growth paths 
and, due to the nonseparability of labor and leisure in the utility function, it is a function of the endogenous choice of 
leisure,  (1 ) ll −  as well as θ. However, nonseparability in utility has the desirable property of guaranteeing a balanced 
growth path with constant leisure, i.e. income and substitution effects cancel out, see e.g Caballé and Santos (1993). 18 
part a function of aggregate risk, a relationship that can be expressed in different ways.  Two recent 
papers by Storesletten et. al, (1999, 2001) and Beaudry and Pages (2001) argue that the idiosyncratic 
risk varies with the realization of the aggregate shocks, being higher when the economy suffers an 
adverse aggregate shock.  In Beaudry and Pages (2001), stabilizing for aggregate shocks implies that 
all volatility, aggregate and idiosyncratic, is eliminated.  In Storesletten et. al, (1999, 2001), the 
elimination of aggregate risk removes the variability of idiosyncratic risk.  We adopt a somewhat 
different approach and project idiosyncratic risk on aggregate risk to obtain an empirical estimate of 
the potential change in average idiosyncratic risk for a given change in aggregate risk. 
4.  Relationship between Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk 
  Recently, several authors have analyzed separately the empirical properties of idiosyncratic 
risk, [e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri 2001], and the properties of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, [e.g. 
Storesletten et al 1999, Altissimo and Zaffaroni 2003].  A novel aspect of our approach is in 
focusing on the projection of idiosyncratic risk,  z σ  on aggregate risk,  y σ .  Indeed, we shall present 
empirical evidence to suggest that there is a strong positive relationship between aggregate volatility 
and the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, so that to the extent a stabilization policy reduces the 
former it reduces the latter as well.  To this end, we postulate the relationship 
     , ( , ) , zy y fx σ σσ ϕ ϕ   =         ( 1 6 )  
This equation can be viewed as a reduced form relationship which asserts that in addition to a direct 
relationship between  y σ  and  z σ , there is an indirect effect that operates through other economic 
variables, x.  In addition, ϕ  denotes a set of exogenous factors that influences the economy in 
general, including possibly idiosyncratic risk.  We see from (16) that even if there is no direct 
relationship between  y σ  and  z σ , a decrease in aggregate volatility through its effect on the 
economic variables in x, may thus still reduce idiosyncratic risk.   
  The linearized version of the reduced form relationship (16) forms the basis for our empirical 
work.  Being an aggregate relationship, we assume that agents in making their individual decisions, 
do not take this, or any underlying stabilization policy that it may embody, into account.  Rather, the 19 
agent observes y σ  and  z σ , as given, with (16) describing the equilibrium relationship between them. 
The econometric identification of the effect of aggregate risk on idiosyncratic risk is not a 
simple task, for various reasons, including the availability of accurate data.  Our objective is to use 
our empirical estimates of a linearized version of (16) to get some sense of the sensitivity of 
idiosyncratic risk to aggregate risk, rather than to focus on the specifics of the equilibrium 
relationship.  To ensure that our findings are reasonably robust we run OLS regressions of 
idiosyncratic risk on aggregate risk, controlling for potential time and age effects, using the various 
measures of both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk, described below.  In addition, we have 
introduced alternative measures of aggregate economic activity as the indirect channel, x, through 
which  y σ  may impact on  z σ .  Of these, the measure of the annual unemployment rate for United 
States (Bureau of Economic analysis data), which we shall denote by lur, is the most satisfactory.  
Intuitively, a change in aggregate risk may lead to a contraction in activity, raising unemployment, 
which would then impact on the variability of individual earnings. 
4.1  Measures of Aggregate Risk 
We shall employ four measures of aggregate risk derived in the following way.
18 
(i)  We obtain data for the value of real GDP per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis 
seasonally adjusted data) for each quarter (that is the value of GDP in a given quarter only) in a given 
year t, take its logarithm, and calculate the standard deviation for the four observations in each year.  
This yields a measure of the quarterly variability of aggregate income per capita within a given year; 
we denote this measure σy|gdp. 
(ii)   Using the same data set as in (i) we also compute the value of real GDP per capita for 
each quarter over the previous year (this is the yearly value of GDP per quarter) in a given year t, 
take its logarithm, and calculate the standard deviation for the four observations in each year. This 
gives us an alternative measure of the variability of aggregate income per individual in the year, 
                                                 
18 Our measures of aggregate risk are distinct from typical measures used in cross -country empirical studies, e.g. Ramey 
and Ramey (1995), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), where country aggregate risk is the standard deviation of GDP 
growth over a long time span, say 20 years. Here, we look at aggregate measures of risk within one year as described 
below. 20 
which we denote by σy|gdp_a.  This measure is smoother than the per quarter measure because of the 
overlapping of observations for each quarter in the whole year, i.e. it also includes values of GDP 
from quarters in the previous year, so it gives a measure of aggregate risk for a longer backward 
horizon relative to the per quarter measure in (i). 
(iii)   We obtain data for the index value of Industrial production (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis seasonally adjusted data) for each month (that is the value in the month only) in a given 
year t, take its logarithm and calculate the standard deviation for the twelve observations in each 
year. This gives us a measure of the variability of the monthly aggregate output within the year, 
which we denote by σy| ip.   
(iv)   We perform the same calculation as (i) for the growth (difference in the logs) of 
quarterly real GDP per capita within the year.  This yields a measure of the standard deviation of the 
aggregate growth rate, denoted by  w σ , as in the theory.   
4.2  Measures of Idiosyncratic Risk 
To check for the robustness of our estimates, we employ three measures of idiosyncratic risk, 
all basically from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
(i)   The first measure is from Gourinchas (2000).
19  These are data for real individual 
earnings (nominal earnings deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator) from 1979-
1992, for 41 cohort-cells, ages 25-65 of the PSID.  The measure of idiosyncratic risk is the standard 
deviation of the log of real individual earnings controlling for time effects and family size as in 
Gourinchas (2000, p 20).  We take the standard deviation and obtain 
σz|Gourinchas : 574 obs, mean= 0.761, stdev=0.081, min= 0.639, max=0.882. 
(ii)   In our model, we focus on permanent idiosyncratic shocks.  Meghir and Pistaferri 
(2001) have calculated measures of the standard deviation of the permanent component of individual 
                                                 
19 We thank Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas for kindly providing his data to us. 21 
earnings also using PSID data.
20  We use the estimates of the standard deviation of the permanent 
component of the individual earnings shock for the period 1969-1991 from Tables A4 (pooled 
sample) and A5 of their paper. The first measure is the estimated standard deviation and the second 
measure is the estimated standard deviation conditional on external factors, i.e. including ARCH 
effects. The properties of these measures are: 
σz|Meghir-Pistaferri:  23 obs, mean=0 .178, stdev=0 .042, min=0 .111, max=0.257 
E[σz|Meghir-Pistaferri]:  23 obs., mean=0 .182, stdev=0 .040, min=0 .117, max=0 .255 
A measure of the total variation of individual earnings in the Meghir and Pistaferri (2001) paper, 
including permanent and transitory components, is: 
σzT|Meghir-Pistaferri:  23 obs, mean=0 .626, stdev=0 .040, min=0 .567, max=0.717 
Relative to the total variation of the individual earnings in this sample, the decompositions of Meghir 
and Pistaferri (2001) show that the average variation of the permanent component accounts for 
approximately 1/3 of the total average variation, i.e. the other 2/3 are accounted for by the transitory 
component. 
(iii)   We also obtained our own sample from the PSID for individual earnings from 1974 
to 1998 (1997 is not available), individuals age 25-65, male and female head of households with at 
least a bachelor's degree for 31 cohort-cells per year.
 21  We calculate the average standard deviation 
of log of individual earnings deflated by the CPI, obtaining: 
σz|PSID-1974-1998: 744 obs, mean=0 .750, stdev=0 .235, min=0 .438, max=1.265 
All measures of idiosyncratic risk confirm with our theoretical model in the sense that all individuals 
face the same average idiosyncratic risk, thougheach may have a different shock.  In comparing the 
alternative measures of idiosyncratic risk, sample (iii) from 1974-1998, which includes the 1990s, 
shows more variability than do the other two samples which do not include the latter period.  
                                                 
20 We thank Luigi Pistaferri for providing additional data from their paper. 
21 We thank Jonathan Fisher of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for kindly providing the data. 22 
4.3 Empirical  Estimates 
Tables 1-3 present results of regressions estimated using OLS with robust standard errors due 
to White (1980).  Table 1 presents the regression results for the Gourinchas (2000) data set.  In Table 
1a, the first column gives an estimate of the effect of aggregate risk measured by the standard 
deviation of quarterly GDP on idiosyncratic risk of about 2.1, with a 95% confidence interval of 
[1.229; 3.069]. In the second column, controlling for the unemployment rate reduces the direct effect 
to about 1.7 [0.478; 2.886].  However we note that in the third column the effect of aggregate risk on 
the unemployment rate is positive so that the overall effect is positive, suggesting that the indirect 
effect reinforces the direct effect.  In Table 1b, the first column gives an estimate of the effect of 
aggregate risk measured by the standard deviation of monthly industrial production on idiosyncratic 
risk of about 2.2 [1.622; 2.734]. In the second column, controlling for unemployment reduces the 
direct effect to about -0.9 [-1.750; 0.0211], but again we note that in the third column the effect of 
aggregate risk on the unemployment rate is sufficiently dominant so that the overall effect is around 
2.522.  Both sets of estimates may be subject to bias due to the omission of other potentially 
significant variables.  But the conclusion from the PSID sample for 1979-1992 [Gourinchas (2000) 
data set] is that aggregate risk has a significantly positive effect on idiosyncratic risk, which 
conservatively can be taken to range between 1 and 3.  That is, a one percentage point decrease in 
aggregate risk will reduce idiosyncratic risk by between around 1 and 3 percentage points.
22 
One of the limitations of the Gourinchas data set is that it includes the transitory component 
of idiosyncratic shocks, whereas our model implicitly focuses on the permanent component.  Table 2 
presents the results using measures of the standard deviation of the permanent component of 
individual earnings using data from Meghir and Pistaferri (2001). 
In Table 2a, for the measure of GDP aggregate risk, we were able to identify the effect for 
the standard deviation of quarterly GDP at annual rates, the longer backward horizon measure.  The 
effect of this measure of aggregate risk on permanent idiosyncratic risk is about 2.8 [0.897; 4.734]. 
                                                 
22 The regressions for all three data sets find that lagged idiosyncratic risk is also highly significant.  This suggests that 
the effect of economy-wide risk on idiosyncratic risk builds up over time, so that it may ultimately be larger than what is 
being suggested.  This would imply that  z σ  is time-varying rather than constant over time as our theoretical model 
assumes.  This in turn would imply that the equilibrium involves a transition to its stochastic balanced growth path. 23 
In the second column, we were able to identify the effect of the within year standard deviation of 
monthly industrial production on permanent idiosyncratic risk obtaining a coefficient of about 2.1 
[.299; 3.995].  The third column presents the effect of the unemployment rate on the permanent 
idiosyncratic risk and the fourth column the effect of within year industrial production risk on 
unemployment. The effect through the unemployment channel is about 0.903 1.397=1.26.   
In Table 2b, the dependent variable is the measure of individual risk including ARCH effects 
as in Meghir and Pistaferri (2001, Table A5).  As in the previous table, for the measure of GDP 
aggregate risk, we could identify the effect for the standard deviation of quarterly GDP at annual 
rates, the longer backward horizon measure. The effect of this measure of aggregate risk on 
permanent idiosyncratic risk is about 2.5 [0.723; 4.371]. In the second column, we were able to 
identify the effect of the within year standard deviation of industrial production on permanent 
idiosyncratic risk obtaining a coefficient of about 1.9 [0.256; 3.694].  The third column presents the 
effect of the unemployment rate on the permanent idiosyncratic risk and the forth column the effect 
of within year industrial production risk on unemployment. The effect from the unemployment 
channel is about 0.903 1.240=1.12.  
Both sets of equations yield generally similar results.  The conclusion from the 1969-1991 
sample of measures of permanent idiosyncratic risk [Meghir and Pistaferri (2001) data set] is that the 
effect of aggregate risk on permanent idiosyncratic risk is positive and of a conservative order of 
magnitude ranging between 1 and 2.5. 
Table 3 presents the results using measures of the standard deviation of the individual 
earnings from our sample of the PSID for the more recent period, 1974-1998.  In Table 3a, for the 
measure of GDP aggregate risk, we could identify the effect for the standard deviation of the growth 
of GDP at quarterly rates (difference of logs).  Evaluating the expression (14d) for the equilibrium 
parameter values suggests  (1 ) 1/ 3 wyAl
β σσ =−≈.  Hence, in the first column the coefficient of the 
standard deviation of the growth of GDP of 3.213 corresponds roughly to an effect of the standard 
deviation of the level of GDP of 3.213/3≈ 1.1 with a standard deviation of approximately 0.2. The 
unemployment rate in this case is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk and the effect of the risk on 
growth of GDP on unemployment is also negative ultimately giving a positive effect of aggregate 24 
risk on idiosyncratic risk through the unemployment channel. The inclusion of the 1990s in the 
sample has a qualitative effect on the unemployment channel, but the overall effect is still positive, 
thus matching the total effect obtained in the first column. 
In Table 3b, the measure of aggregate risk of the standard deviation of the level of monthly 
industrial production is relatively well identified. In the first column, the effect of the standard 
deviation of industrial production is about 1.6 [0.921; 2.292], roughly confirming our estimate from 
the first column of Table 3a. In the second column, the unemployment channel increases the direct 
effect of the aggregate risk on idiosyncratic risk from about 1.6 to 2.6. In the third column, the effect 
of σy| ip on unemployment is positive and this confirms the results of the first column and the relative 
effects of including the 1990s in the sample.  The conclusion from the 1978-1998 sample of 
measures of idiosyncratic risk [our PSID sample data] is that the effect of aggregate risk on 
idiosyncratic risk is positive and of a conservative order of magnitude of 1 to 1.6.  
Overall, our evidence, using alternative measures of both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, 
suggests that aggregate risk has a substantial positive effect on idiosyncratic risk.  Taking into 
account biases due to data limitations it seems that overall a 1 percentage point change in aggregate 
risk will plausibly lead to a change in idiosyncratic risk of between 1 and 3 percentage points. 
5. Numerical  Results 
5.1  The benchmark and sensitivity analysis 
In the numerical simulation, we begin by considering a benchmark economy in which there 
is no production risk.  We then introduce an economy-wide production risk of 2.5%, consistent with 
the Ramey-Ramey (1995) and other aggregate studies.  We next add idiosyncratic risk of 6 times the 
size of the aggregate risk, consistent with the Pischke (1995) evidence, setting σz = 0.15, and in 
order to obtain some idea of the sensitivity to σz, we increase it to 0.20.  Finally, we consider a 
slightly riskier economy in which σy = 0.04,σ z = 0.26, the relative magnitudes of the two types of 
risk again being consistent with the empirical evidence.   
Equilibrium values for key quantities are reported in Table 4.  In each case we compute the 
welfare gains from eliminating all the aggregate risk under varying assumptions regarding the extent 25 
to which the reduction in aggregate risk is accompanied by a reduction in idiosyncratic risk.  These 
results are reported in Table 5.  The striking conclusion of these results is that the reduction of 
aggregate risk need be accompanied by only a modest elimination of idiosyncratic risk -- certainly 
well within the degree suggested by the empirical evidence -- in order for aggregate stabilization to 
yield significant welfare improvement. 
  In all cases we focus on the labor flexibility parameter θ = 1.75 as representing the most 
plausible case, and subsequently consider the impact of variations in this parameter.  Panel A reports 
the benchmark case of zero risk.  For a coefficient of risk aversion R = 2.5, we obtain an equilibrium 
growth rate of 1.81%, with 0.704 of the agent’s time being allocated to leisure, implying an output-
capital ratio of around 0.31, and a consumption to capital ratio of over 25%.  The ratio C K  of 
around 0.25 is reasonably close to the empirical evidence suggested by Carroll (2000), this being due 
to the inclusion of labor income, in the absence of which C K  would otherwise drop to around 0.07.  
In a riskless economy, an increase in γ  represents a decrease in the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.  Thus we see that γ = −4,γ = −8 are associated with increases in consumption and 
reductions in the growth rate.   
  Panel B introduces aggregate risk of 2.5%.  The main point to observe is that aggregate risk 
of this magnitude has a negligible impact on the equilibrium, even for values of the coefficient of 
risk aversion as high as 9.  This finding is consistent with Lucas (1987, 2003) and Turnovsky (2000).   
Certain aspects of the equilibrium change dramatically with the introduction of idiosyncratic 
risk, σz = 0.15 in Panel C.  In Part (i), for a moderate degree of risk aversion R = 2.5, the growth 
rate jumps to just 2%, and while the aggregate volatility remains low at 0.8%, the individual 
volatility increases dramatically to 4.8%.  On the other hand, labor supply, the capital-output ratio, 
and the consumption-capital ratio are all relatively insensitive to the degree of risk in the economy -- 
either aggregate or idiosyncratic – even for a relatively high degree of risk aversion. 
  In Part (ii) of Panel C, the idiosyncratic risk is increased from 0.15 to 0.20.  This change has 
a substantial impact on the equilibrium growth rate and its volatility.  The same pattern continues in 
Part (iii) of Panel C which considers a slightly riskier economy in which σy = 0.04,σz = 0.25. 
One important feature common to the three cases in Panel C is the non-monotonicity of the 26 
mean growth rate with respect to R.  This is in contrast to the monotonic decrease in (mean) growth 
with R in Panels A and B.  The reason for this is that, for the constant elasticity utility function, an 
increase in (the magnitude of) γ  reflects both a decrease in the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and an increase in the degree of risk aversion, i.e. both effects are entangled.
 23  The 
effect of the lower intertemporal substitution is to increase consumption and to reduce the growth 
rate, while higher risk aversion has the exact opposite effect because there is only risky capital 
available for investment (incomplete insurance).  Thus, for the cases of no risk or low levels of risk 
in Panels A and B, the former intertemporal substitution effect dominates and we get the observed 
monotonic decline in (mean) growth.  But, for the case of higher levels of risk (including 
idiosyncratic risk) in Panel C, as R increases, the two effects trade-off and we obtain the observed 
non-monotonic behavior of the mean growth rate. 
  In all cases the equilibrium is highly sensitive to the labor elasticity parameter θ.  Panels A-
C illustrate the effects of an increase in the substitution between leisure and consumption (or 
increases in the elasticity of labor supply) measured by alternative values of θ.  As θ increases say 
from 1 to 2.5, c/k and  yk  decline as l increases.  This is because increased substitution between 
leisure and consumption allows an agent to substitute toward more leisure and less consumption 
along the indifference curve moving across balanced growth paths.  This reduces the productivity of 
capital, reducing the output capital ratio and the consumption to capital ratio.  The reduction in work 
reduces both the aggregate and idiosyncratic risk and the corresponding mean growth rate.  Most 
notably, more flexibility in labor supply is associated with reduced volatility at both the individual 
and aggregate levels.  This is because adding the labor/leisure margin allows an individual to use 
labor supply flexibility to buffer the uninsurable risk. 
5.2  Gains from Aggregate Stabilization 
  We now turn to the results presented in Table 5.  This table reports the effects of eliminating 
                                                 
23 Note that by using the constant elasticity utility function, γ is related to both the coefficient of relative risk aversion R 
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ε by  11 R γ ε = −= .  Thus setting γ  = –1.5, -4, -8, is also equivalent to 
assuming ε = 0.4, 0.2, 0.11, respectively, which is also consistent with the empirical evidence.  Introducing a recursive 
preference function enables us to disentangle the two parameters ε,R.  27 
the aggregate volatility, accompanied by varying degrees of reductions in idiosyncratic risk.  Again, 
we shall focus our remarks on the benchmark case θ = 1.75.  Suppose that the economy is initially in 
equilibrium with moderate aggregate riskσy = 0.025 and idiosyncratic risk σz = 0.15, [Panel C(i) of 
Table 1].  Assume that the stabilization authority decides to eliminate all the aggregate risk.  In this 
case, if doing so has no effect on idiosyncratic risk, then if the coefficient of risk aversion R = 2.5, 
the welfare gain so obtained is only 0.06% of initial aggregate capital stock.  Moreover this increases 
to only 0.14% if the coefficient of risk aversion reaches R = 9, the upper bound on its plausible 
value.  These welfare effects are negligible, confirming that the familiar results of Lucas (1987) 
obtained for the stochastic Ramsey model extend to the stochastic endogenous growth model. 
  Now suppose that the reduction in aggregate risk of 0.025 is accompanied by a 
corresponding reduction in idiosyncratic risk by 0.025 from 0.15 to 0.125, for the empirical slope 
coefficient of 1, the plausible lower bound suggested by our empirical evidence.  In this case we find 
that the welfare gains from stabilization increase dramatically.  If R = 2.5 they increase 
approximately 12-fold to 0.73%, and to over 1% for higher, but plausible degrees of risk aversion.  
Moreover, the gains are due overwhelmingly to the reduction in the idiosyncratic risk rather than to 
the elimination of the aggregate risk.  In other words a reduction in idiosyncratic risk from 0.15 to 
0.125 is far more beneficial than an equivalent reduction in aggregate risk from 0.025 to 0.   
  If the reduction in aggregate risk is accompanied by an approximate doubling in the 
reduction of idiosyncratic risk from 0.15 to 0.10, then the gains from the stabilization of the 
aggregate risk increase to between 1.3% to 2.8%, depending upon the degree of risk aversion.  If 
further, for the empirical slope coefficient of 3, thelikely upper bound, in the process of eliminating 
the aggregate risk, the idiosyncratic risk is halved to 0.075, the gains increase further to between 
1.7% and 3.7%.  Finally, if in the process of stabilizing the aggregate risk, the idiosyncratic risk is 
also eliminated entirely as in Beaudry and Pages (2001), the welfare gains increase to between 2.3% 
and 4.9%.  In these extreme cases, the welfare gains from eliminating moderate aggregate risk are 
unquestionably substantial.  But it is interesting to note that over half of the maximum potential 
welfare gains can be achieved by eliminating just one third of the idiosyncratic risk.  This is an 
obvious consequence of the fact that the risk appears as a variance in the equilibrium. 28 
  Looking across Panel 2 (i) we see that since low values of θ are associated with increased 
risk, at both the aggregate and individual levels, the gains from stabilization are correspondingly 
increased, and similarly reduced as θ increases. We have already noted that leisure increases with θ.  
But the positive welfare effect of additional leisure is dominated by the negative effects on growth 
and consumption reducing both overall and the gains from stabilization as well.  
  Panels (ii) and (iii) conduct a similar exercise for the higher degrees of risk and yield the 
same pattern of benefits.  In all cases, we find that the welfare gains from eliminating aggregate risk 
with no reduction in idiosyncratic risk are extremely low.  If one looks at this table overall, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that welfare gains from aggregate stabilization of the order of 2-3%, consistent 
with the empirical evidence by Clark, Leslie, and Symons (1994) are not implausible, even with 
relatively modest accompanying reductions in idiosyncratic risk.  Certainly it would seem highly 
likely that the welfare gains are at least 1% and this clearly cannot dismissed as being negligible. 
6.  Some Implications for Asset Pricing 
  We now briefly examine the implications of the model for equilibrium asset pricing.  To do 
this we consider the implicit pricing of a risk-free asset. Suppose such an asset (a bond) pays a return 
r.  Following Saito (1998) and others, with all agents being identical the only equilibrium is the no 
trade equilibrium, the implication of which is that the equilibrium risk-free rate of return is 
  r= r K − (1−γ)(σ y
2 + σ z
2)≡ (1− β)A(1− l)
β −δ − (1− γ)A
2(1− l)
2β(σ y
2 + σ z
2)   (17a) 
Thus, the risk premium on (untraded) capital is 
    
22 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) K yz rr A l
β γ σσ −=− − +      (17b) 
  The expression in (17b) is a direct generalization of Saito (1998) to include endogenous 
labor.  It asserts that total risk is the sum of aggregate risk plus idiosyncratic risk, as a result of which 
the latter raises the risk premium, even if it is uncorrelated with aggregate risk, as we are assuming.  
This contrasts with the characterization presented by Constantinides (2002), who points out that in 
addition to being uninsurable and permanent, idiosyncratic risk must also be countercyclical, i.e. 29 
must be negatively correlated with equity returns.  This is because in recessions, say, individuals 
face a double jeopardy of loss in employment and returns, thus requiring a higher premium to invest 
in risky financial assets.  The difference is reconciled by noting that the literature discussed by 
Constantinides identifies idiosyncratic risk with labor income, whereas we assume labor income is 
riskless; see (11a).  Instead, in our analysis, the idiosyncratic risk is associated with the return to 
untraded capital.
24  Thus our result reflects the fact that more volatility on an untraded risky asset 
requires a higher mean return in order for that asset to be held in equilibrium, e.g. Obstfeld (1994). 
  Table 6 reports the rates of return, the premium on the return to capital, and the savings rate 
for the varying degrees of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.  The following patterns can be identified.   
  (i)  The mean return on capital is relatively insensitive to both the degree of risk aversion and 
to the degrees of aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility.  This is because it is determined by the labor 
supply, which is insensitive to these parameters. 
(ii)  In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the mean return on capital and the savings rate are 
both nonmonotonically related to the degree of risk aversion.  This reflects the corresponding 
nonmonotonicity in the growth rate, noted earlier. 
  (iii)  Aggregate volatility has a negligible effect on the riskless rate.  In contrast, idiosyncratic 
risk has a substantial negative impact on the riskless rate, particularly when the degree of risk 
aversion is large.  This is because high savings associated with the precautionary motive drives the 
rates of return down, and with the mean rate of return on capital insensitive to idiosyncratic shocks, 
the adjustment is borne by the riskless rate. 
  (iv)  In the case of relatively high volatility in Panel (iii) for R = 9 and θ = 1.75 the premium 
to capital reaches 6%, although the riskless rate is still around 2.4%.  Moreover, if for this last case 
the share of labor in production is increased to β = 0.65, then the riskless rate drops to 0.8%, with 
the risk premium increasing to 6.1%, consistent with the empirical evidence.  The implied welfare 
                                                 
24 Krebs and Wilson (2004) distinguish between these two sources of idiosyncratic risk, referring to them as “labor 
income risk” and “entrepreneurial risk”, respectively.  They present a discrete-time stochastic production model in which 
output is a constant returns to scale function of physical capital and human capital, with raw labor being supplied 
inelastically.  Conditioning the idiosyncratic risk on the aggregate state as in Storesletten et al (1999, 2001) they find that 
uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk has a non-negligible effect on the equity premium, of the order of 1%. 30 
gains from eliminating the aggregate risk remain around 3% as long as they are associated with a 
modest reduction in the idiosyncratic risk from 0.26 to 0.24. 
  (v)  Both the return on capital and the risk-free rate are highly sensitive to the flexibility of 
labor supply, θ.  As θ increases, the impact falls relatively more on the return on capital, causing 
the equity premium to be less sensitive to the degree of idiosyncratic risk. Again, more labor supply 
flexibility helps individuals buffer the uninsurable risk, thus reducing the price of the riskless asset 
and increasing its rate of return. But we note that even with a flexible labor supply, modest decreases 
in idiosyncratic risk can generate large gains from stabilization and a plausible risk premium.   
  In effect, our results confirm the results of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Saito (1998) 
that idiosyncratic permanent nondiversifiable shocks increase the risk premium.
25  Our contribution 
is to show that in a general equilibrium production framework even with endogenous labor/leisure 
choice functioning as a buffer to this kind of risk, the effect of idiosyncratic shocks on asset pricing 
is quantitatively significant.  
7. Conclusions 
A plausible dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic structure should be able 
to explain some observed anomalies.  In this regard, stochastic models in which all shocks are 
economy-wide imply that the welfare costs of observed aggregate volatility are negligible.  But in 
reality idiosyncratic shocks exist and are important, and indeed empirical evidence suggests that the 
volatility of such shocks is several times that of aggregate shocks.  Thus in this paper we have 
derived an equilibrium growth path in which agents are subject to both types of shocks.  
Although the existence of idiosyncratic shocks has little impact on the welfare gains obtained 
from eliminating aggregate shocks alone, again it seems plausible and is supported empirically that 
the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk is positively related to the degree of aggregate risk.  Thus we find 
that if in the process of eliminating the aggregate risk, the policymaker can reduce (but not eliminate 
                                                 
25The model can also generate reasonable properties for the relative volatility of average equity returns.  For example, for 
the parameter set of Table 6.B(i), with  4 γ =− , we see that  8.44% K r = , an equity premium of 1.12%.  The volatility on 
the average return to capital, which from (11b’) is given by  (1 ) yK A lr
βσ − , equals 9.12%.  For the parameter set of 
Table 6B(iii), with  8, 0.65 γ β =− = , we obtain  6.93% K r = , an equity premium of 6.1%, and the volatility on the 
average return to capital increases to 18%. 31 
completely) the typical agent’s idiosyncratic risk by an amount suggested by the empirical evidence, 
the welfare gains from aggregate stabilization are no longer insignificant.  On the contrary they may 
plausibly be of the order 2-3%, consistent with the empirical evidence of Clark, Leslie, and Simmons 
(1994).  Moreover, the bulk of the gains are obtained from the reduction of the idiosyncratic risk, by 
even modest amounts, rather than from the macro stabilization.  This finding carries with it the 
policy implication that a large payoff to aggregate stabilization policy is to try and stabilize the 
environment in which individuals operate.   
The introduction of idiosyncratic risk has important implications for asset pricing, and in 
particular may reduce the risk-free rate substantially.  By impinging significantly on precautionary 
savings, it puts downward pressure on the rates of return.  However, with the mean productivity of 
capital and its mean rate of return determined by labor supply, which is insensitive to idiosyncratic 
shocks, the adjustment is reflected primarily in the risk-free rate. 
Many of our results are sensitive both to the degree of risk aversion, which we have restricted 
to lie within an empirically plausible range, and also to the flexibility of labor supply.  As the 
flexibility of labor supply increases, volatility is reduced and the benefits from aggregate 
stabilization decline as well.  We provide a general equilibrium version of the result of Bodie et al 
(1992) that labor supply flexibility helps smooth consumption by buffering risk. 
In general, our model highlights the tradeoffs involved in analyzing the effects of risk on 
growth and welfare, on the one hand, and on asset pricing, on the other.  These tradeoffs involve 
many dimensions, including the flexibility of the labor supply, thus emphasizing the need to examine 
these issues within a stochastic general equilibrium framework. 
There are several fruitful avenues for future research, of which two stand out.  First, a natural 
extension would be to introduce stochastic labor income, with part of that risk being idiosyncratic.  
Second, our specification of the technology abstracts from any potential negative effects that 
production risk may have on factor productivity.  Early empirical work on stochastic production 
functions has suggested that this may be significant, and if so, it would provide a further potentially 
important avenue whereby aggregate risk may impose welfare costs on the economy.
 26  
                                                 
26 See e.g. Just and Pope (1978) 32 
Appendix 
A.1  Derivation of Optimality Conditions  
  The representative agent's stochastic optimization problem is to choose consumption and the 
rate of capital accumulation to maximize: 









   ( A . 1 a )  
subject to the stochastic capital (wealth) accumulation equation: 
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where the agent takes r K,r Li   as given, and  (1 ) ( )
i K i du A l dy dz
β ≡− +.  These are functions of 
aggregate (average) labor supply and are also taken as given by the individual agent.  Dividing 
(A.1b) by Ki, yields  
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    (A.1b’) 
where ψ i denotes the agent’s mean rate of capital accumulation. 
Equation (11a’) of the text specifies that the equilibrium wage rate is tied to the individual’s  
capital, Ki  However, this is only the case in equilibrium and the individual in making his decisions, 
does not perceive this.  Instead, he perceives his wage rate as growing exogenously with time, 
independently of his own capital, Ki(t), and hence we write  ()
i L rt , the equilibrium solution for 
which is derived in (A.24) below. 
  Since the individual perceives the state variable, Ki, and since time appears both additively 
(through  r Li (t)) and through the exponential time discounting, we propose a value function of the 
time-separable form
27 
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27 It is also possible to solve the stochastic optimization problem by postulating a value function of the form 
V(Ki, K,t)≡ e
−ρtX(Ki,K).  This formulation involves two state variables and is equivalent to, but more cumbersome 
than, the approach adopted.  33 
We define the differential generator of the value function V(Ki,t) to be 
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where for convenience we let 
2222 2 22 (1 ) ( ) uw x y z Al
β σ σσ σσ ≡+= − +  denote the sum of the variances 
of the economy-wide and idiosyncratic shock. 
The individual's formal optimization problem is to choose Ci to maximize: 
     ()
1
[() ( ) ]
tt
ii eC l e X K H t
γ ρρ
γ
−−   +Ψ +       (A.4) 
Taking the partial derivative of (A.4) with respect to Ci and l and canceling e
−ρt, yields 
    
1(1 ) ( ) iK i Cl X K
γθ γ − −=      ( A . 5 a )  
    
1 (1 ) ( ) ( )
i iL K i Cl r t X K
γθ γ θ
− −=       ( A . 5 b )  
where  XK(Ki) is the marginal value of an extra unit of capital.  Dividing (A.5b) by (A.5a) leads to 
equation (13c).  In principle, we may solve equations (A.5a) and (A.5b) to obtain the following 
expressions for the individual’s consumption and labor supply 
     ( , ( ) )
i ii L CC K r t ≡        ( A . 6 a )  
     ( , ( ) )
i iL ll K rt ≡         ( A . 6 b )  
In addition, the value function must satisfy the Bellman equation 
     ()
1
max [ ( ) ( )] 0
i
tt
ii C eC l e X K H t
γ ρθ ρ
γ
−−   +Ψ+ =   
   (A.7) 
which may be expressed as (where dot denotes time derivative):  
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This Bellman equation holds for all values of Ki, at all points of time t.  Thus we can take the partial 
derivative of this equation with respect toKi.  In so doing, we note that H(t) is independent of (the 
agent’s)  Ki, while (A.6) implies that Ci (and potentially l) is a function of Ki.  Performing this 
calculation yields: 
11 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
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and using (A.6a, A6b) this reduces to  
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Consider now  ()
ii K Ki X XK = , the stochastic differential of which is: 
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Taking expected values of (A.10), and dividing by dt, implies 
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and substituting (A.11) into (A.9) leads to the relationship: 
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The solution to this equation is by trial and error. Given the objective function (A.1a), we propose: 
     () ii X KK
γ ε =         ( A . 1 3 )  
where the parameter ε  is to be determined.  Evaluating the partial derivatives XKi (Ki), XKiKi (Ki) 
and substituting into (A.12), the expected marginal utility evolves in accordance with: 
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Combining with (A.10), the actual marginal utility follows the stochastic process 
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To determine the equilibrium growth path, we recall the optimality condition (A.6a).  Taking the 
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Using (A.15) to evaluate this expression leads to 













 dt + dui     (A.16) 
Focusing on a stochastic balanced growth path along which Ed C i Ci ( )= Ed K i Ki ()  and recalling 
the definition of dui = dw +dxi leads to (13a) of the text: 
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   (A.17a) 
Substituting this into (A.1b’) and focusing on the deterministic component leads to (13b) of the text: 
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     (A.17b) 
A.2  Solution for the Value function 
Although the above solution has been obtained without completely solving the Bellman 
equation, we must nevertheless ensure that it is met.  First, recall the optimality condition (A.5).  
Evaluating this for the value function (A.13) implies, so that  
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Note that in equilibrium, when r Li Ki =βA(1− l)
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and is constant, implying that ε is constant, consistent with the conjectured solution (A.13). 
Now return to the Bellman equation, (A.8), written as 
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Substituting for (A.19) and recalling the assumed form of (A.13), we can write this in the form 
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and substituting (A.19) into (A.20) the latter reduces to the following differential equation in H(t), 
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Since future values of Kiare not yet known, the bounded solution to this equation is 
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Intuitively, (A.22) asserts that the (utility) value associated with the labor income stream, that the 
agent takes as exogenously given, equals the discounted expected stream of future wage income 
evaluated at the marginal utility of income, εKi
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  Finally, we may solve for  ()
i L rt  as follows.  Solving the individual’s accumulation equation 
(3b) of the text, individual i’s stock of capital at time t is 37 
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where ψ  is the mean equilibrium growth rate.  Substituting into (11a), we immediately obtain 
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This is seen to be an explicit function of time, both through the risk-adjusted mean growth rate, and 
the accumulation of past disturbances over the period (0, t), all of are known at time t, thereby 
validating the initial assumption. 
A.3  Evaluation of Welfare along the Equilibrium Path 
  The transversality condition is given by 
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Solving (A.17a), substituting into (A.18) and evaluating, this reduces to the condition 
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Table 1:  Gourinchas (2000) data set.  (Sample: 1979-1992) 42 
 
a.  Aggregate volatility measure based on gdp 
 
  σz  σz  lur 



























  n =533 
2 r  =0.30 
F(3,529)=120.6 
n=533 
2 r =0.52 
F(4,528)=202.5 
n=574 




b.  Aggregate volatility measure based on industrial production 
 
  σz  σz  lur 





























  n=533 
2 r =0.33 
F(3,529)=170.1 
n=533 
2 r =0.52 
F(2,528)=221.7 
n=574 
2 r =0.44 
F(2,571)=196.2 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis: * significant at the 1% level;  
**significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 10% level. 
dependent and independent variables data are stacked by cohort-cell per year. 43 
Table 2: Meghir-Pistaferri (2001) data set.  (Sample: 1969-1991)   
 
a.  Dep.var. is s.d of the permanent component of individual earnings shock 
 
  σz  σz  σz  lur 








































  n=22 
2 r =0.53 
F(3,18)=10.3 
n=22 
2 r =0.52 
F(3,18)=9.1 
n=22 
2 r =0.52 
F(3,18)=12.0 
n=23 




b.  Dep. var. is s. d. of the permanent component of individual earnings shock  
conditional on external factors 
 
  [] z E σ   [] z E σ   [] z E σ   lur 








































  n=22 
2 r =0.51 
F(3,18)=9.71 
n=22 
2 r =0.51 
F(3,18)=8.5 
n=22 
2 r =0.50 
F(3,18)=10.4 
n=23 
2 r =0.32 
F(2,20)=5.1 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis: * significant at the 1% level; 
**significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: PSID data set.  (Sample: 1974-1998) 
  
a.   Aggregate volatility measure based on aggregate growth 
 
  σz  σz  lur 



























  n=713 
2 r =0.90 
F(3,709)=2135
n=713 
2 r =0.90 
F(4,708)=1655
n=744 




b.  Aggregate volatility measure based on industrial production 
 
  σz  σz  lur 



























  n=713 
2 r =0.90 
F(3,709)=2119
n=713 
2 r =0.91 
F(4,708)=1699
n=744 
2 r =0.25 
F(2,741)=122.0 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis: * significant at the 1% level; 





Table 4:     Equilibria 45 
(A = 0.65,ρ = 0.04,β = 0.6,δ = 0.04) 
A.  No Risk  σy = 0; σ z =0 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y k       c k   ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y k       c k  ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y
.5  3.004   0.000   0.000   0.577  0.388   0.317   1.812   0.000   0.000   0.704   0.313   0.255  1.090   0.000   0.000   0.771   0.2
  1.453   0.000   0.000   0.588  0.382   0.327  0.871   0.000   0.000   0.711   0.309   0.260  0.521   0.000   0.000   0.776   0.2
   0.796   0.000   0.000   0.593  0.379   0.331  0.475   0.000   0.000   0.714   0.307   0.262  0.284   0.000   0.000   0.777   0.2
 
B.  Aggregate Risk Only  σy = 0.025; σ z = 0 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck    ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck   ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y
.5  3.011   0.969   0.969   0.577  0.388   0.318   1.817   0.783   0.783   0.704   0.313   0.255  1.093   0.672   0.672   0.771   0.2
  1.472   0.954   0.954   0.588  0.382   0.327  0.883   0.772   0.772   0.711   0.309   0.260  0.531   0.663   0.663   0.776   0.2
   0.833   0.948   0.948   0.593  0.379   0.331  0.500  0.768   0.768   0.713   0.307   0.262  0.302   0.660   0.660   0.777   0.2
 46 
C.  Aggregate Plus Idiosyncratic Risk   
(i):σy = 0.025; σ z = 0.15 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck    ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck   ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y
.5  3.284   0.972   5.913   0.575   0.389   0.316  1.997   0.785   4.778   0.702   0.314   0.254  1.226   0.672   4.088   0.770   0.2
  2.159   0.961   5.846   0.583   0.384   0.323  1.335   0.778   4.730   0.707   0.311   0.258  0.865   0.667   4.059   0.773   0.2
   2.188   0.961   5.848   0.583   0.385   0.323  1.391   0.778   4.734   0.707   0.311   0.257  0.961   0.669   4.067   0.772   0.2
 
(ii)  σy = 0.025; σ z = 0.20 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck    ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        yk        ck   ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y
.5  3.498   0.974   7.854   0.574   0.390   0.315  2.139   0.787   6.345   0.701   0.315   0.253  1.330   0.673   5.429   0.770   0.2
  2.707   0.966   7.792   0.579   0.387   0.320  1.696   0.782   6.303   0.705   0.313   0.256  1.131   0.671   5.408   0.771   0.2
   3.297   0.972   7.839   0.575   0.389   0.316  2.119   0.787   6.343   0.701   0.315   0.254  1.498   0.676   5.446   0.768   0.2
 
 (iii)  σy = 0.04 σ z = 026 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y k       c k   ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y k       c k  ψ ≡ψ i   σψ       σψ i        l        y
.5  3.851   1.564   10.29   0.571   0.391   0.313  2.372   1.264   8.311   0.700   0.316   0.252  1.503   1.081   7.109   0.768   0.2
  3.629   1.561   10.26   0.573   0.390   0.314  2.303   1.262   8.302   0.700   0.316   0.253  1.579   1.082   7.119   0.768   0.2
   5.226   1.586   10.43   0.561   0.396   0.304  3.384   1.283   8.438   0.692   0.321   0.247  2.427   1.100   7.235   0.762   0.247 
Table 5:  Welfare Gains from Stabilization of Aggregate Shocks 
 (i) σy reduced from 0.025 to 0  
 
  and σz reduced from 0.15 to   
0.15       0.125         0.10        0.075        0  0.15      0.125         0.10        0.075        0  0.15      0.125         0.10        0.07  
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
%∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) 
.5  0.076      0.908      1.589      2.117      2.796  0.061      0.734      1.283      1.710      2.259  0.053      0.631      1.104      1.472
   0.104      1.245      2.172      2.889      3.807  0.086      1.026      1.790      2.382      3.138  0.075      0.900      1.571      2.090
   0.164      1.956      3.402      4.515      5.931  0.135      1.612      2.805      3.723      4.891  0.119      1.414      2.462      3.268
 
(ii) σy reduced from 0.025 to 0 
 
  and σz reduced from 0.20 to   
0.20      0.175         0.15        0.10        0  0.20      0.175         0.15        0.10        0  0.20      0.175         0.15        0.10  
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
%∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) 
.5  0.078      1.241      2.248      3.794      5.027  0.063      0.999      1.810      3.053      4.046  0.054      0.858      1.553      2.621
   0.110      1.743      3.144      5.275      6.959  0.090      1.427      2.576      4.323      5.704  0.078      1.247      2.250      3.778
   0.180      2.844      5.105      8.503      11.16  0.147      2.319      4.164      6.941      9.111  0.128      2.020      3.629      6.054
 
(iii) σy reduced from 0.04 to 0 
 
  and σz reduced from 0.26 to   
0.26        0.22         0.18        0.13        0  0.26        0.22         0.18        0.13        0  0.26        0.22         0.18        0.13  
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5 
%∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) % ∆(Ω) 
.5  0.207      2.690      4.751      6.742      8.905  0.166      2.152      3.800      5.390      7.118  0.142      1.839      3.248      4.607
   0.306      3.931      6.886      9.697      12.71  0.248      3.184      5.580      7.861      10.31  0.215      2.760      4.841      6.824










Table 6:     Rates of Return 
 
A.  Aggregate Risk Only  σy = 0.025; σ z = 0 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5   
r K           r        r K − r    sy r K           r        r K − r    sy r K           r        r K − r    sy
γ =− 1.5  11.51    11.51      0        18.1 8.53     8.52     0.01      18.6  6.72     6.71     0.01      19.0 
γ =− 4  11.27    11.22    0.05     14.3 8.36     8.33     0.03      15.8  6.61     6.59     0.02      17.1 
γ =− 8   11.17    11.09    0.08     12.7 8.28     8.23     0.05      14.7  6.56     6.52     0.04      16.3 
 
B.  Aggregate Plus Idiosyncratic Risk   
(i):σy = 0.025; σ z = 0.15 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5   
r K           r        r K − r    sy r K           r        r K − r    sy r K           r       r K − r    sy 
γ =− 1.5  11.55    10.68    0.87     18.7 8.57     8.00     0.57      19.1  6.75     6.33     0.42      19.4 
γ =− 4  11.38     9.67     1.71     16.0 8.44     7.32     1.12      17.2  6.68     5.85     0.83      18.2 
γ =− 8   11.38     8.30     3.08     16.1 8.45     6.43     2.02      17.3  6.70     5.21     1.49      18.6 
 
(ii)  σy = 0.025; σ z = 0.20 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5   
r K           r        r K − r    sy r K           r       r K − r    sy  r K           r       r K − r    sy 
γ =− 1.5  11.59    10.05    1.54     19.2 8.59     7.59     1.00      19.5  6.77     6.04     0.73      19.6 
γ =− 4  11.46     8.43     3.03     17.4 8.51     6.52     1.99      18.2  6.73     5.27     1.46      19.1 
γ =− 8   11.56     6.03     5.53     18.8 8.59     4.70     3.62      19.4  6.81     4.14     2.67      20.4 
 
(iii)  σy = 0.04 σ z = 026 
 
θ = 1.0  θ = 1.75  θ = 2.5   
r K           r       r K − r     sy r K           r       r K − r    sy   r K           r       r K − r    sy  
γ =− 1.5  11.64    9.00    2.64      20.0  8.64     6.91     1.73      20.2  6.81     5.55     1.26      20.4 
γ =− 4  11.61    6.34    5.27      19.6  8.62     5.18     3.45      20.0  6.82     4.29     2.53      20.6 
γ =− 8   11.86    2.07    9.79      23.3  8.83     2.42     6.41      23.0  7.00     2.29     4.71      23.4 
γ =− 8 
β = 0.65 
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